This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. 695 20 What is the key claim of the 'Liberal Democratic Peace' thesis? A major terrorist attack launched from Afghanistan would represent a kind of equal opportunity disaster and should make a commitment to establishing and preserving a capable state of ultimate value to all involved. [11] This Article conceptualizes a stag hunt in which the participants are countries that host extractive companies on their stock exchanges, including the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, the Member States . Nations are able to communicate with each other freely, something that is forbidden in the traditional PD game. In this section, I survey the relevant background of AI development and coordination by summarizing the literature on the expected benefits and harms from developing AI and what actors are relevant in an international safety context. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. On the other hand, real life examples of poorly designed compensation structures that create organizational inefficiencies and hinder success are not uncommon. Additionally, Koubi[42] develops a model of military technological races that suggests the level of spending on research and development varies with changes in an actors relative position in a race. In order to assess the likelihood of such a Coordination Regimes success, one would have to take into account the two actors expected payoffs from cooperating or defecting from the regime. 15. [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. From that moment on, the tenuous bonds keeping together the larger band of weary, untrusting hunters will break and the stag will be lost. Moreover, each actor is more confident in their own capability to develop a beneficial AI than their opponents. In this section, I briefly argue that state governments are likely to eventually control the development of AI (either through direct development or intense monitoring and regulation of state-friendly companies)[29], and that the current landscape suggests two states in particular China and the United States are most likely to reach development of an advanced AI system first. If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. Namely, the probability of developing a harmful AI is greatest in a scenario where both actors defect, while the probability of developing a harmful AI is lowest in a scenario where both actors cooperate. 0000004572 00000 n the 'inherent' right to individual and collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter and enforcement measures involving the use of force sanctioned by the Security Council under Chapter VII thereof. While each actors greatest preference is to defect while their opponent cooperates, the prospect of both actors defecting is less desirable then both actors cooperating. [20] Will Knight, Could AI Solve the Worlds Biggest Problems? MIT Technology Review, January 12, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/545416/could-ai-solve-the-worlds-biggest-problems/. If the regime allows for multilateral development, for example, the actors might agree that whoever reaches AI first receives 60% of the benefit, while the other actor receives 40% of the benefit. d (PDF) THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS I-II - ResearchGate Some observers argue that a precipitous American retreat will leave the countryand even the capital, Kabulvulnerable to an emboldened, undeterred Taliban given the limited capabilities of Afghanistans national security forces. In order to mitigate or prevent the deleterious effects of arms races, international relations scholars have also studied the dynamics that surround arms control agreements and the conditions under which actors might coordinate with one another. In the event that both actors are in a Stag Hunt, all efforts should be made to pursue negotiations and persuade rivals of peaceful intent before the window of opportunity closes. [16] Google DeepMind, DeepMind and Blizzard open StarCraft II as an AI research environment, https://deepmind.com/blog/deepmind-and-blizzard-open-starcraft-ii-ai-research-environment/. The Stag Hunt Theory and the Formation Social of Contracts : Networks 0000000696 00000 n As we discussed in class, the catch is that the players involved must all work together in order to successfully hunt the stag and reap the rewards once one person leaves the hunt for a hare, the stag hunt fails and those involved in it wind up with nothing. In the stag hunt, what matters is trust Can actors trust that the other will follow through Depends on what they believe about each other, What actors pursue hinges on how likely the other actor is to follow through What is Game Theory theory of looking strategic interaction As discussed, there are both great benefits and harms to developing AI, and due to the relevance AI development has to national security, it is likely that governments will take over this development (specifically the US and China). The Stag Hunt: A Lesson in Game Theory - Ascenturn [32] Paul Mozur, Beijing Wants A.I. For example, one prisone r may seemingly betray the other , but without losing the other's trust. f(x)={323(4xx2)0if0x4otherwise. <<3B74F05AAAB3B2110A0010B6ACF6FC7F>]/Prev 397494>> [47] George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, & Randolph M. Siverson, Arms Races and Cooperation, World Politics, 38(1: 1985): 118146. 2020 Yale International Relations Association | New Haven, CT, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, Interview with YPG volunteer soldier Brace Belden, Shaping Saddam: How the Media Mythologized A Monster Honorable Mention, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Percent of benefits Actor A can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Percent of benefits Actor B can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Actor As perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Actor Bs perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Actor As perceived harm from developing a harmful AI, Actor Bs perceived harm from developing a harmful AI.
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